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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Douglas B. Malar appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On May 18, 2015, Malar filed a petition for post-conviction relief
challenging his conviction for DUI.

(R., pp. 4-7.)

He alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to suppress, failing to inform him
“exactly” what constituted the offense, and wishing to proceed to arraignment
without discovery.

(R., pp. 5-6, 9.)

He also alleged that law enforcement

withheld favorable evidence and that he pled guilty because of threats. (R., p. 5.)
He requested to withdraw his guilty plea and proceed with a trial. (R., p. 6.)
The state filed a motion for summary dismissal, asserting that the petition
was untimely to challenge the May 11, 2012 judgment. (Aug., pp. 10-11.) Malar
acknowledged that his petition had not been filed within a year, but asserted that
his failure to do so was “due to the ineffective counsel [sic] of all of my Public
Defenders that ultimately led to my untimely filing of the Petition for PostConviction Relief.” (R., pp. 14-15; Aug. pp. 13-15.) His specific allegations were
as follows:
2.
On March 16, 2012, I was arraigned in CR 12-1289. At that
time I expressed to Sarah Sears, my appointed Public Defender,
that I did not feel I was guilty of the underlying criminal matter.
3.
In May 2012, after l was sentenced, I asked my Public
Defender about appealing my case because I still felt I was not
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guilty. When my probation was set, Ms. Sears informed me there
was no further action I could take on the matter.
4.
When I violated my probation in September 2012, I again
asked if there was a way to retract my plea, or appeal my case, and
I was informed there was not.
5.
In December 2014, l asked Lisa Cheeseboro, the assigned
Public Defender, about having the issue revisited. She informed me
she was not aware of a way to do so.
6.
Christopher Schwartz was assigned as my Public Defender
when my sentence was imposed on January 9, 2015. I asked him
about appealing my case and was told I could not appeal my
sentence or conviction regardless of the fact that I entered an
Alford Plea. I entered a Rule 35 plea at that time.
7.
It was not until I came to prison that I learned about the
Motion for Post-Conviction Relief and how it may benefit me.
(R., p. 15.)
The district court granted the motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp. 1724.) The district court held that Malar’s petition was time-barred. (R., pp. 20-21.)
The district court determined that, to be timely from the judgment, the petition
had to be filed before June 23, 2013. (R., p. 20.) In addressing tolling, the
district court accepted Malar’s allegations, made in his affidavit in response to the
state’s motion, that his attorneys had told him he could neither appeal nor seek
post-conviction relief.

(R., p. 23.)

Applying the relevant legal standard of

whether the petitioner knew of the factual basis for his claims, the district court
concluded that Malar knew the factual basis for his claims in 2012, and therefore
the time to file the petition did not toll. (R., pp. 23-24.)
The district court entered judgment (R., p. 26), from which Malar timely
appealed (R., p. 28).
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ISSUE
Malar states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Malar’s PostConviction Petition after finding it was untimely filed?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Malar does not assert that the claims alleged in his petition were timely or
that the district court erred in dismissing them. He instead argues that the facts
he asserted in relation to his tolling argument constitute viable and timely claims
for post-conviction relief on which he should have been allowed to proceed. Has
Malar failed to show error?
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ARGUMENT
Malar Has Failed To Show Error In The Dismissal Of His Untimely Petition
A.

Introduction
Malar does not challenge the dismissal, on statute of limitation grounds, of

the claims asserted in his petition.

(Appellant’s brief.)

Malar argues that

because the state conceded that the facts in his affidavit in opposition to the
state’s motion for summary dismissal must be considered true for purposes of
the motion, those facts were “litigated by all of the parties in this case.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.) Therefore, according to Malar, a claim of ineffective
assistance of probation counsel was “fully tried by consent.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp. 9-10.) Malar argues that, because the claim was tried by consent, he must
be granted an evidentiary hearing on the claim.

(See Appellant’s brief, p. 5

(“Malar certainly should have been allotted an evidentiary hearing on this
claim”).) This argument is flawed.
B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, the appellate court

applies the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examines whether the
petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the
petitioner to relief. Gutierrez-Medina v. State, 157 Idaho 34, 36, 333 P.3d 849,
851 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925,
929 (2010)). The appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Id.
(citing Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009)).
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C.

Malar’s Claim That The Facts Alleged In His Affidavit In Opposition To The
State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal Were Tried By Consent Fails
Because There Has Been No Trial
“An application for post-conviction relief must specifically set forth the

grounds upon which the application is based, and clearly state the relief desired.”
Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008)
(citing I.C. § 19-4903). “All grounds for relief must be raised in the original,
supplemental, or amended application.”

Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4908).

It is

undisputed that the “claim” on which Malar asserts he is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing is not pled in the petition.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) permits parties to try issues not raised
by the pleadings with the explicit or implicit consent of the parties. See I.R.C.P.
15(b). Rule 15(b) only applies to unpled theories that are litigated through the
submission of evidence at trial. Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 86, 967 P.2d 284,
288 (1998). Rule 15(b) does not apply to factual issues raised in a motion for
summary judgment. Id. “Rule 15(b) applies only to unpled theories that are
litigated through the submission of evidence at a trial of the cause on the merits,
and not to factual issues raised in a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
Malar’s claim fails on the law because there have been no issues tried by
consent, because there has been no trial. This case was dismissed in summary
dismissal proceedings. An evidentiary hearing (trial) in order to litigate a claim on
the merits is the remedy Malar is seeking. His claim that he is entitled to litigate
the merits of the assertions in the affidavit because he has already by consent
litigated those merits makes no sense, legally or logically.
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Malar’s argument also fails on the facts.

In support of its motion for

summary dismissal, the state argued that the question presented was “whether
the statute of limitations in effect can be abrogated in this case.” (8/25/15 Tr., p.
5, Ls. 15-18.) The state argued that tolling required lack of access to courts due
to incapacitation or geographical impediments, but did not apply where a
defendant was given bad advice on challenging his conviction by counsel.
(8/25/15 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 – p. 6, L. 16.)

In making this argument, the state

acknowledged that the facts asserted in Malar’s affidavit in opposition to the
state’s motion must be assumed to be correct. (8/25/15 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 6-9.)
In responding to the state’s argument, Malar’s counsel acknowledged that
there was no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding advice on
appeal or pursuing post-conviction, but that they were considering filing an
amended petition to assert that claim. (8/25/15 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 3-14.) Counsel then
argued that the factual assertions in Malar’s affidavit should provide equitable
tolling for the petition.

(8/25/15 Tr., p. 7, L. 18 – p. 10, L. 25.)

Counsel

concluded: “If the Court makes the determination it shouldn’t [apply equitable
tolling], he’s past his deadlines. If it finds it should, then he should be allowed to
file an amended petition with the assistance of counsel and proceed with his
claims.” (8/25/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 1-4.)
The prosecutor replied that the remedy requested in the petition was
withdrawal of the guilty plea and a trial, and that claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel for “not being advised of the post conviction relief statute” did not
show prejudice. (8/25/15 Tr., p. 11, L. 8 – p. 12, L. 1.) The district court asked
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whether Malar’s allegations he “asked for an appeal and didn’t get one” had to be
accepted as true. (8/25/15 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 2-6.) The prosecutor agreed, stating he
was “not controverting the fact that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel,” but even “[a]ssuming he did not receive correct legal advice” such
would not legally toll the statute of limitations. (8/25/15 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 7-25.) The
district court then asked about Malar’s counsel’s comments about amendment,
and the prosecutor agreed that Malar “would be able to bring up items that
occurred” within a year prior to filing. (8/25/15 Tr., p. 13, L. 1 - p. 14, L. 7.)
This record does not support Malar’s claim that the parties “litigated”
claims in his affidavit in opposition to the state’s motion for summary judgment.
To the contrary, it is clear that both parties understood that for those claims to be
properly before the court the petition would have to be amended. The record
only establishes that the parties and the district court understood well-established
law: that because the affidavit was uncontroverted, its allegations had to be
accepted as true for purposes of summary dismissal. E.g., Hayes v. State, 146
Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008) (“For purposes of considering
a summary dismissal motion, an applicant's uncontroverted factual allegations
contained in an application for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavits are
deemed to be true.”).
Malar’s argument that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for
failing to file an appeal from revocation of probation was litigated by the parties,
and therefore the case should be remanded with instructions to hold an
evidentiary hearing on that issue, is meritless. Moreover, the argument also fails
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because the record shows that the parties understood that the only mechanism
to get that claim before the court was by amending the petition. Malar has failed
to show that the district court erred.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal
of the petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2016.
_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of June, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender’s basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk’s office.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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